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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This Comment analyzes systemic risk in the financial system and 
shows how current regulations provide insufficient protection for our 
capital markets. Though the mortgage crisis and subsequent liquidi-
ty crisis currently affecting Wall Street provide the context for this 
analysis, this Comment is neither meant as a full account of these 
events, nor a detailed exploration of our banking regulations. Rather, 
this Comment shows how the incentives created by our current regu-
latory regime lead to externalities that threaten the stability of the 
financial system.1 By focusing on the incentives guiding financial ac-
tors, this Comment proposes a novel approach to financial regulation 
using mechanisms that have effectively internalized external costs in 
conceptually similar scenarios. 
 Current regulatory mechanisms aimed at producing financial sta-
bility, specifically the Basel II Capital Adequacy Framework, actual-
ly exaggerate crises by forcing firms to sell assets during liquidity 
shocks, compounding their tendencies to panic. These command and 
                                                                                                                     
 *. J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., Florida State 
University. Special thanks to Professor Dino Falaschetti, Alyssa Lathrop, and Trevor Thompson. 
 1. This Comment roughly documents events that occurred through the summer of 
2008; while the crisis has evolved considerably since then, my analysis of the financial ac-
tors’ underlying incentives remains unchanged. 
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control regulations fail because they attempt to legislate around the 
problem instead of adequately addressing the inefficient incentives 
that influence firms and their managers. However, as this Comment 
discusses below, a market-based cap and trade system may resolve 
many of these issues by directing firms toward more socially optimal 
investment strategies. 
 This Comment begins with a short summary of systemic risk and 
follows with an analysis of the subprime crisis in Part II. Part III 
provides a brief background on economic regulation and shows how a 
tradable permit system can efficiently reduce systemic risk. Part  
IV concludes. 
II.   A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMIC RISK 
 Systemic risk has been the subject of extensive economic commen-
tary, but it has received little attention from legal scholars.2 In part, 
this is due to the abstract nature of the problem. Systemic risk is 
“not always defined and remains somewhat nebulous,” making ana-
lyses difficult.3 Further, definitions across the literature are not en-
tirely consistent.4 However, systemic risk can be generally defined as 
the risk that a negative shock to a firm or asset will result in losses 
or failure across the financial system.5 
 This risk is a result of the divergence between private and socially 
optimal investment strategies.6 Firms price only the internal costs 
and benefits of any particular transaction and not risks to the finan-
cial system.7 This produces a classic externality: firms imposing costs 
on third parties will not, without regulation, internalize the effects of 
their actions. Concretely, it is more profitable to take on more risk 
and leverage than is socially optimal.8 
                                                                                                                     
 2. This Comment is one of the few to address the problem. The first was Professor 
Steven Schwarcz’s Systemic Risk. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 247 
(2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (noting that it is “the first major work of legal 
scholarship on systemic risk”). 
 3. John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial Intermediation, and Systemic Risk, 
13 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (2007). 
 4. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 196-97. 
 5. See id.; Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 5-6. 
 6. This divergence is commonly referred to as a prisoner’s dilemma. The rational 
choice for each agent leads to collectively unfavorable consequences.  
 7. See Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability to Respond to Threats to the Fi-
nancial System: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 110th Cong. 49 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Systemic Risk Hearings] (statement of Richard Bookstaber), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:39
903.pdf (stating that firms do not price external risks); Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 6 
(observing that systemic risk is an externality); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 
206 (“Thus, market participants will not want to internalize those costs and will take an 
insufficient amount of care to prevent them.”). 
 8. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
2009]                          FINANCIAL POLLUTION 247 
 
III.   ANALYZING THE CREDIT CRISIS 
 Though intuitively appealing, the crisis is not the result of wide-
spread mortgage fraud or predatory lending, as generally believed.9 
While current foreclosure rates are record setting, national data has 
only been collected since 1979, and the previous record was set after 
the 2001 recession, which was hardly the Great Depression.10 Though 
attributed to failing subprime securities, the credit crunch was a re-
sult of misaligned incentives, which created externalities entirely un-
related to the housing market. Subprime defaults served only as a 
trigger event for an endogenous response that amplified losses across 
the market. 
A.   MBS Risk Modeling Understated Default Risk 
 The poor performance of subprime mortgages affected Wall Street 
through mortgage backed securities (MBS), which were sold and held 
by nearly all major financial institutions. MBS are created when 
lenders pool mortgages into a legally distinct subsidiary special pur-
pose vehicle (SPV).11 These loans are resold to a second SPV, often 
owned by an investment bank, which finances the purchase of these 
loans by selling bonds on the capital markets.12 The proceeds from 
the sale are used to pay the first SPV for the loans, which are in turn 
used to pay the lender.13 These bonds are divided into prioritized 
                                                                                                                     
 9. There are a number of articles mistakenly criticizing the subprime mortgage 
market as a market for lemons. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory 
Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 
(2002); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002); Kathleen C. Engel & Patri-
cia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Blind Eye]; Patricia A. McCoy, 
A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005); John A.E. Pot-
tow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405. 
 10. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND 
FORECLOSURE TRENDS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC AND MARKET 
DEVELOPMENTS 14 (2008) [hereinafter RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0878r.pdf. 
 11. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 
2208-09 (2007); Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal 
Structure and a Fanciful Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 621-22 (2008). 
 12. Peterson, supra note 11, at 2208-09; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Secu-
ritization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135, 142 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy]. 
 13. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What 
Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715 (2004); Peterson, su-
pra note 11. For a more detailed look at securitization, see COMM. ON BANKR. & CORP. 
REORGANIZATION, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NY, STRUCTURED FINANCING 
TECHNIQUES 6 (2005) (originally published in 50 BUS. LAW. 527 (1995)); STEVEN L. 
SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 6-7 
(2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004); 
Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 12. 
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tranches that allocate risk and returns among note holders.14 Be-
cause these offerings are so complex and the production of invest-
ment grade securities so critical,15 structured offerings are heavily in-
fluenced by ratings agencies’ analysis of the underlying collateral.16 
 Though investment grade securities bear little risk, they comprise 
more than ninety percent of any particular deal. Conversely, subor-
dinated tranches compose roughly ten percent of the average MBS 
structure but bear almost all the risk.17 Because tranching prioritizes 
payments, junior securities are leveraged against the mortgage pool, 
creating significant tail risk for these investors.18 If losses exceed the 
value of junior securities, they will be wiped out and the next junior 
class will be impacted, up to the senior class. Thus, small miscalcula-
tions with regard to losses can have disparate effects in subordinate 
tranches.19 The effect is that junior tranches “have the appearance of 
producing very high alphas (high returns for low risk)” by ignoring 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See sources cited supra note 13. Senior tranches receive first priority to payments 
and are practically guaranteed. Subordinated tranches demand a higher rate of return and 
are paid only if there are sufficient funds. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 
4 (2005) [hereinafter ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE], available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf (“A key goal of the tranching process is to create at least 
one class of securities whose rating is higher than the average rating of the underlying col-
lateral pool or to create rated securities from a pool of unrated assets. This is accomplished 
through the use of credit support (enhancement), such as prioritisation of payments to the 
different tranches.”); Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 12, at 143 (“The interest rate on these 
subordinated securities would be higher than the interest rate on the non-subordinated (or 
senior) securities to compensate for the greater risk.”). 
 15. Most MBS may only be sold to qualified investors, and many of the primary pur-
chasers of structured finance products have ratings-based constraints limiting their in-
vestment options. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14; Engel &, 
McCoy, Blind Eye, supra note 9, at 2047; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008) (defining 
qualified investor). 
 16. See DEBASH CHATTERJEE ET AL., MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICES, 2007 REVIEW AND 
2008 OUTLOOK: HOME EQUITY ABS 2-3 (2008). 
 17. David Greenlaw et al., Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market 
Meltdown 17 (Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.chicagogsb.edu/ 
usmpf/docs/usmpf2008confdraft.pdf (indicating that, in typical subprime securitization, se-
curities are 80% AAA, 9.6% AA, 5% A, 3.5% BBB, and only 1.1% lower rated). 
 18. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 4. See generally 
Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Finance Made the World Riskier?, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 499 
(2006); Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond 
Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market 
Disruptions (May 14, 2007) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1027475. Tail risk is the term for positions or investments “that offer[] high re-
turns most of the time but entail[] a hidden risk, albeit a small risk, of extraordinary losses 
or default.” Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Perspective, 39 
RUTGERS L.J. 541, 575 n.201 (2008). The analogy is often made to disaster insurance: in-
surers demand high premiums to cover hurricane-prone property. As long as a disaster 
never occurs, these companies make considerable profit. However, in the rare event that a 
disastrous storm occurs, the costs of covering the damage can be devastating. Cf. Rajan, 
supra, at 516. 
 19. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 12. 
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the risk of rare, devastating events.20 While an MBS bond will gener-
ally outperform comparably rated corporate bonds, in rare events the 
loss volatility significantly exceeds the risk posed by comparable in-
vestments, exposing investors to significant losses.21 
 As the housing market slowed, lenders attempted to maintain 
market share by originating higher loan-to-value ratio mortgages, of-
ten with adjustable rates.22 Many of these loans did not fully docu-
ment the borrowers’ income or assets. Though these loans carried in-
creased risk of default, they are not the cause of the subprime crisis: 
as the terms of loans became riskier, lenders compensated by lending 
to increasingly creditworthy borrowers.23 Lenders increased default 
only by creating a class of homeowners who were particularly sensi-
tive to declining house price appreciation.24 
1.   Mortgage Backed Securities Relied on Faulty Loan 
Assumptions 
  Subprime MBS tranches are structured according to ratings 
models, which evaluate the expected default rate of the mortgage 
pool.25 Though obvious now, the models were produced from funda-
mentally incomplete data. Because subprime lending was cyclically 
untested, these models could not quantify the effects of depreciation 
on subprime borrowers.26 
  Default can take two forms.27 The first, ruthless default, is de-
termined by a borrower’s rational choice.28 Rational borrowers de-
                                                                                                                     
 20. Rajan, supra note 18, at 516. 
 21. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 11-12 (“As a result, 
given that ratings are based on expected loss or probability of default, structured finance 
tranches can be significantly riskier than investments in bond portfolios with identical 
(weighted average) ratings.”). 
 22. CHATTERJEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 2. 
 23. KEVIN KENDRA & GLENN COSTELLO, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE DISTRESS EFFECT ON 
CDOS 25 (2007), available at http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/sectors/subprime/ 
CDO_Exposure_to_Subprime_Mortgage_Markets_Web_Cast_w_RMBS_Slides.ppt. 
 24. See Krisopher Gerardi et al., Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeowner-
ship and Foreclosure 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 15, 2007), 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0715.pdf. 
 25. See COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., supra note 14, at 16-20; Mason & Rosner, 
supra note 18, at 8. 
 26. David Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 14 n.8 (citing FITCH RATINGS, 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SPECIAL REPORT: DRIVERS OF 2006 SUBPRIME VINTAGE 
PERFORMANCE (2007)). 
 27. Gerardi et al., supra note 24, at 8-9. Note that these two concepts are not strictly oppo-
site; rational borrowers are unlikely to default if they are not also experiencing some cash flow 
problems. Id. at 3-4, 8-9 (noting that neither concept is completely theoretically satisfying). 
 28. Michelle A. Danis & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Delinquency of Subprime 
Mortgages, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 67, 71 (2008) (“[T]he main feature of a ruthless default is 
that it makes financial sense because the mortgage is substantially larger than the value 
of the property.”). This is also referred to as the option model of default. Gerardi et al., su-
pra note 24, at 8. 
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fault only if they have negative equity, as refinancing or selling is 
preferable to foreclosure.29 Once the outstanding balance of the loan 
exceeds the home’s value, it may be rational to default if opportunity 
cost of maintaining the loan exceeds the value of maintaining the 
loan.30 The second, distressed default, occurs when a borrower, de-
spite his or her best efforts, cannot maintain payments.31  
 It appears that “low subsequent house price appreciation” is the 
primary factor influencing the increased delinquency of 2006 and 
2007 vintage subprime loans.32 Because models predict defaults from 
the loss history of similar loans,33 ratings do not immediately reflect 
changes in underwriting standards.34 When the market began to fall, 
borrowers’ incentives fundamentally changed in a way that subprime 
borrowing had never experienced. This paradigm shift was simply 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Danis & Pennington-Cross, supra note 28, at 68 (“A mortgage is put . . . when the 
mortgage outstanding is greater than the value of the property after accounting for costs 
such as transaction fees.”); Gerardi, supra note 24, at 10 (“[N]egative equity is a necessary 
condition for default.”). 
 30. For example, a borrower expecting to live in a home for many years may not be in-
fluenced at all, while investors would have greater incentives to default. See Todd J. Zy-
wicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1, 44 (2008) (“[U]nless a given homeowner intends to sell her home, short-term 
changes in property values are fundamentally irrelevant to these borrowers.”); id. at 33 
(“[Evidence] suggests that an increasing number of subprime loans in recent years may 
have been issued to investors and speculators, not to families. Because these properties 
were bought for the purpose of speculation, their owners might be especially likely to exer-
cise the default option in response to declining residential real estate prices.”). 
 31. Id. at 26, 50-51; see also Danis & Pennington-Cross, supra note 28, at 68 (noting 
that nonfinancial motivations, such as “losing a job, a severe illness, or the breakup of a 
household,” can also lead to default). 
 32. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis 2, 32-33 (Dec. 5, 2008) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1020396; see also GLENN COSTELLO, FITCH RATINGS, UPDATE ON U.S. RMBS: 
PERFORMANCE, EXPECTATIONS, CRITERIA 11 (2008) (indicating that, of the loans that origi-
nated in 2006, twenty-three percent of borrowers with 636 FICO scores, second liens, and 
negative appreciation are delinquent, while approximately fifteen percent of borrowers 
with 607 FICO scores, negative appreciation but no second lien are delinquent); KENDRA & 
COSTELLO, supra note 23, at 25 (indicating that defaulted loans have a ten percent higher 
loan-to-value ratios than performing loans); RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, 
supra note 10, at 33 (showing graph indicating close positive relationship between foreclo-
sure rates and areas with sharpest drop off of home price appreciation). 
 33. Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 13-14 (explaining that the common model for es-
timating default “simply extrapolates the performance – defaults, loss severities, and total 
loss rates – of each ‘vintage’ (origination year) of subprime and other mortgage loans, 
based on its own history as well as the typical progression pattern through time”). 
 34. See Mason & Rosner, supra note 18, at 38 (noting that “changes to origination 
standards may be manifested in adverse loan performance only after a substantial lag”); 
see also Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 30, at 50 (noting that default models were devel-
oped during a period of continuous appreciation and “may not be equally valid when ap-
plied to subprime borrowers or in a declining real estate market”); Greenlaw et al., supra 
note 17, at 14 (“[B]ecause the detailed mortgage performance data required to build these 
types of models are available only back to the mid-1990s, there are no observations on how 
defaults and losses on a particular vintage change through time when home prices start  
to fall.”). 
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not captured by ratings models. Adjustable rate loans, though demo-
nized, were not the cause of the fallout; the “overwhelming majority” 
of subprime loans entered foreclosure prior to the interest  
rate resetting.35 
  The occurrence of these defaults was surprising only because of 
the limited history of subprime borrowing. Default models have been 
developed over a period of largely uninterrupted appreciation in 
housing prices.36 Prior to 2006, subprime borrowers could easily re-
finance or sell instead of foreclosing, which produced unrealistic as-
sumptions about subprime borrowing. However, after the market 
fell, many otherwise creditworthy borrowers had an incentive to de-
fault. This paradigm shift in borrower incentives would have been 
impossible to predict from historic performance data. 
2.   MBS Have Been Downgraded—Not Wiped Out 
 Because ratings models did not anticipate the regime shift in sub-
prime performance, issuers undercollateralized subprime securities. 
When defaults exceeded expectations, cash flows were compromised, 
and mortgage pools could not meet their obligations to investors. 
However, the extent to which the actual worth of these securities was 
impacted still is not clear. The market value of subprime MBS has 
fallen because, once these assets depart from ratings agency predic-
tions, it is nearly impossible to determine how to price them. 
 After the performance of subprime mortgage securities began to 
suffer, Moody’s, a large ratings agency, revised its credit risk model 
and reviewed outstanding securities, resulting in significant down-
grades.37 However, these ratings revisions are primarily confined to 
securities issued after housing prices began to decline.38 Practically 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 30, at 28. Hybrid adjustable rate mortgages have 
been blamed for much of the current mortgage crisis. See, e.g., Sheila C. Bair, Op-Ed., Fix 
Rates to Save Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at A25, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/19/opinion/19bair.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. These loans 
have artificially low interest rates for two to three years, which reset to a higher adjustable 
rate. RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 10, at 16, 40; see also De-
myanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 32, at 6. However, the worst performing loans were 
originated in 2006 and 2007. Id. at 2 (“The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 was characte-
rized by an unusually large fraction of subprime mortgages originated in 2006 and 2007 
becoming delinquent or in foreclosure only months later.”). These loans began to reset only 
recently and mathematically could not have been the cause of the subprime crisis; interest rates 
on the 2006 vintage only began resetting in 2008, well after the mortgage market collapsed.  
 36. See Gerardi et al., supra note 24, at 35 (noting “the favorable economic environ-
ment that has largely characterized the existence of the subprime mortgage market from 
its emergence in 1993 up until the past few years”); Mason & Rosner, supra note 18, at 3. 
 37. PETER MCNALLY, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICES, U.S. SUBPRIME RMBS 2005-2007 
VINTAGE RATING ACTIONS UPDATE: JANUARY 2008, at 1 (2008). 
 38. See Mason & Rosner, supra note 18, at 6-7; see also Demyanyk & Van Hemert, su-
pra note 32, at 2 (noting that subprime crisis disproportionately affected 2006-07 mortgages). 
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none of the 2005 vintage first-lien securities have been impacted.39 
For the 2006 vintage, however, downgrades have been more pro-
nounced. Nearly half of 2006 first-lien securities, including over nine-
ty percent of all assets below its highest rating of AAA, have been 
downgraded.40 Downgrades for 2007 securities have not been as se-
vere, with thirty-seven percent of first-lien and fifty-five percent of 
second-lien tranches being downgraded.41 
 Though downgrades are easily cataloged, actual losses are cur-
rently impossible to determine.42 Though both 2005 and 2006 each 
have delinquencies exceeding thirty percent of the outstanding bal-
ance, cumulative losses are still below two percent.43 While delin-
quent mortgages are not meeting monthly obligations, we cannot de-
termine how the final worth of these securities will be affected. For 
instance, if all delinquent properties foreclose, losses will be cata-
strophic. Conversely, losses will be mitigated if lenders modify the 
loans or if borrowers are able to refinance or become current. The 
problem is not that tranches have been wiped out, but that there is 
no way to determine how far they have diverged from model price.44 
 This uncertainty is a primary cause of the current crisis. As MBS 
performance declined, investors had an incentive to move these as-
sets off of their balance sheets before losses increased.45 However, col-
lective selling depressed both price and liquidity. Under the mark-to-
market rule, firms had to revalue their balance sheets to reflect this 
new market price.46 This created a negative feedback loop such that 
                                                                                                                     
 39. MCNALLY, supra note 37, at 2 (2008) (indicating that less than six percent of 2005 
first-lien notes were downgraded). Second-lien securities have fared worse, id., but the un-
derlying collateral was much riskier and these securities were only a minimal part of the 
market. See id. at 5-8 (showing that second-lien securities accounted for less than ten per-
cent of rated transactions in any given year). 
 40. Id. at 2-3. Similarly, over ninety percent of all second-lien securities have been 
downgraded. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See David Reilly, Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market; Accounting Rules Blasted as 
Dow Falls; A $600 Billion Toll?, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 1, 2008, at A1. 
 43. ANDREW J. GIUDICI & ERNESTINE WARNER, STANDARD & POOR’S, U.S. SUBPRIME 
RMBS PERFORMANCE UPDATE: JANUARY 2008 DISTRIBUTION DATE (2008), 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/4,5,5,1,1204262834087.html. 
 44.  See, e.g., Bomi Lim, Merrill May Fail to Sell Bad Loans to Korea Asset, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid= 
a0QemFmcMrdA&dbk (describing Merril Lynch’s difficulty selling troubled loans because 
of difficulties in pricing the assets). 
 45. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214 (“Panics can trigger market 
failures . . . when doubt arising over a market’s future liquidity triggers a stampede to sell 
first while the market is still liquid . . . .”). 
 46. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(1) (2000) (“Any security which is inventory in the hands of 
the dealer shall be included in inventory at its fair market value.”); FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS 
BD., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 133-3 (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/ 
aop_FAS133.pdf (requiring all entities to account for derivatives and hedges at a “fair val-
ue”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2008) (requiring financial statements to be pre-
pared according to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles); The Roles of the SEC 
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the decision to sell by one firm imposes a negative price effect on the 
balance sheets of all other firms, creating an incentive to be the first 
to sell.47 The result was a panic that made subprime MBS virtually 
illiquid, destroying what little market existed.48 Once the market 
dried up, banks were “left oxymoronically trying to estimate what 
market prices would be if markets existed.”49 This is a liquidity crisis; 
the market price is “disconnected” from the actual value of these se-
curities.50 Indeed, many investors are adamant that these securities 
are worth significantly more than what they are currently valued in 
the market.51 
B.   A Systemic Crisis 
 As the market for subprime mortgage securities fell apart, the 
firms’ reactions became disconnected from the housing market and 
the value of any particular asset. Collective purchasing and selling 
strategies created a tragedy of the commons, where competitive in-
centives led to perverse, inefficient results. The systemic risk is not 
that subprime securities are correlated to the housing market, but 
that firms priced only the internal costs and benefits of their invest-
ment strategies and not the risk imposed on the financial system.52 
                                                                                                                     
and the FASB in Establishing GAAP: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., 
Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 2 (2002), availa-
ble at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/051402rh.pdf (testimony of Robert K. 
Herdman, Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (noting that the SEC considers 
FASB statements definitive for determining GAAP). 
 The mark-to-market rule requires “companies to value many of the securities they 
hold at whatever price prevails in the market, no matter how sharply those prices swing.” 
Reilly, supra note 42. See generally Daniel Gross, The Mark-to-Market Melee: Is an Obscure 
Accounting Rule to Blame for the Credit Market Meltdown?, SLATE, Apr. 1, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2187880. 
 47. See Guillaume Plantin et al., Marking-to-Market: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 46 
J. ACCT. RES. 435, 439 (2008) [hereinafter Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?]; 
Reilly, supra note 42. 
 48. See Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, supra note 47, at 439 (“Anticipating 
this negative outcome, a short-horizon firm is tempted to preempt the fall in price by sell-
ing the asset itself. However, such preemptive action merely serves to amplify the price 
fall.”); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
 49. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Mark to Meltdown?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008, at A16, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120468045939012133.html. 
 50. See Reilly, supra note 42 (“ ‘Many people would take the view that price and ulti-
mately [sic] value have disconnected.’ ” (quoting Neal Soss, Chief Economist, Credit Suisse)).  
 51. Jenkins, supra note 49 (predicting write-ups will “undo much of the damage once 
the ‘panic’ subsides”); Reilly, supra note 42. 
 52. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 206. See generally PRESIDENT’S 
WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999). 
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This creates an externality imposed by the unpriced costs of exploit-
ing the financial system—a public good.53 
 Subprime MBS are an attractive investment as lower rated 
tranches generally outperform similarly rated securities with the 
same average expected loss54 and have the “appearance of producing 
very high . . . returns for low risk.”55 However, rare losses to these as-
sets can be substantial. For fund managers,56 who are compensated 
and compete based on returns, the incentive is to “load up” on these 
assets to outperform rival firms.57 However, competitors are forced to 
take similar risks, pushing firms toward increasingly inferior in-
vestment strategies.58 This incentive reinforces suboptimal invest-
ment strategies in two ways. First, in the short term, firms that take 
excessive risk will outperform more conservative rivals; in order to 
maintain market share, these other firms must then increase leve-
rage and exposure to illiquid markets to remain competitive.59 
Second, because the entire market is engaged in similar strategies, a 
large loss will affect everyone, reducing accountability for poor per-
formance.60 These firms are “well aware of the consequences of their 
moves into less liquid markets, as are their counterparties.”61 The 
problem is not a lack of disclosure or asymmetric information, but of 
individual incentives that must be aligned with the efficient  
collective outcome.62 
 The same maximizing incentives to take risky positions also create 
incentives to be the first to sell if there is fear of an impending liquidi-
ty problem.63 This rush to sell creates a fire sale, “inadvertently  
                                                                                                                     
 53. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000) (describing market stability as a public good); Schwarcz, Systemic 
Risk, supra note 2, at 207-08 (“[P]reservation of the financial system is socially desirable.”). 
 54. ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, at 11-12. 
 55. Rajan, supra note 18, at 516. 
 56. Though hedge funds have been demonized, the incentives involved are common to 
most financial actors. See generally Rajan, supra note 18.  
 57. Id. at 516-17; see also Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 9 (indicating that a hedge 
fund’s “opacity and incentive structure may increase the likelihood of such an event as 
managers turn toward high-risk strategies with substantial tail-risk”). 
 58. See Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 13 (discussing concern that competition may 
create “pressures that weaken credit risk mitigation practices”); cf. James Brown et al., 
Auditor Independence and Earnings Quality: Evidence for Market Discipline vs. Sarbanes-
Oxley Proscriptions 14-15 (Fla. State Univ. College of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 
259, 2008) (discussing governance spillovers in auditor independence context).  
 59. Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 13 (stating competition may result in “inadequate 
risk controls such as lower initial margin levels, collateralization practices, or exposure 
limits”); Rajan, supra note 18, at 517 (discussing incentive to herd on risky investments). 
 60. Rajan, supra note 18, at 517. 
 61. Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 8 box 2. 
 62. Brown et al., supra note 58, at 15 (“Indeed, even if markets enjoy complete infor-
mation about a firm’s governance decisions, they will only price the internal costs and ben-
efits of those decisions.”). 
 63. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214. 
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destroying the market’s liquidity.”64 This effect is produced because 
firms’ balance sheets are linked: one firm’s decision to sell depresses 
the value of all like assets.65 If a firm’s balance sheet is sufficiently af-
fected, a liquidity crisis can turn into a solvency crisis. The rational 
strategy is then to preemptively sell as soon as performance declines, 
avoiding mark-to-market losses. Collectively, every firm feels this in-
centive, amplifying the price fall.66 Stated differently, herding on the 
upside of the market leads participants to herd on the downside as 
well, creating a system where actors buy high and sell low.67 
 Problematically, the very regulations that were supposed to re-
duce system risk contributed to the crisis. The Basel Capital Accords 
are international banking regulations promulgated by the Bank for 
International Settlements.68 The Basel Accords calculate minimum 
amounts that capital banks must maintain to prevent institutional 
failure and ensure financial stability. The United States is currently 
implementing Basel II69 while phasing out its previous incarnation, 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 214-15. 
 65. Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, supra note 47, at 439 (“A bad outcome 
for the asset depresses fundamental values somewhat, but the more pernicious effect 
comes from the negative externalities generated by other firms selling. When others sell, 
observed transaction prices are depressed more than is justified by the fundamentals, and 
exert a negative effect on all others, but especially on those who have chosen to hold on to 
the asset.”). 
 66. Id. at 439-40. 
 67. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 216-17. While Professor Schwarcz calls 
this behavior irrational, it is only collectively irrational; individually, such behavior is 
maximizing, producing a prisoner’s dilemma. Id.; see also Rajan, supra note 18, at 516-18 
(describing perverse incentives for fund managers); Hyun Song Shin, Risk and Liquidity in 
a System Context 4 (BIS Working Papers No. 212, 2006) [hereinafter Shin, Risk and Li-
quidity], available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=898411. 
 68. “The [Bank for International Settlements] is an international organisation which 
fosters cooperation among central banks and other agencies in pursuit of monetary and fi-
nancial stability. Its banking services are provided exclusively to central banks and inter-
national organisations.” Bank for International Settlements, http://www.bis.org (last vi-
sited Apr. 11, 2009). 
 69. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework —
Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, 12 C.F.R. pt. 
208, 225, 12 C.F.R. pt. 325, 12 C.F.R. pt. 559, 560, 563, 567); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs128.pdf; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board Ap-
proves Final Rules to Implement Basel II Risk-Based Capital Framework (Nov. 2, 2007) 
[hereinafter Implementing Basel], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/20071102a.htm. 
 The Federal Reserve, SEC, FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, and Office 
of Thrift Supervision all share regulatory and oversight responsibilities for Basel in the 
United States. These agencies have implemented the Accord on varying timelines. For in-
stance, the SEC allows investment banks, defined as broker-dealers, to voluntarily use Ba-
sel II to compute net capital requirements. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 Similarly, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have adopted a Final Rule requiring 
commercial banks and other institutions to adopt Basel II. This rule, however, has not 
been fully implemented. Since April 1, 2008, these institutions have been able to begin a 
mandatory parallel run of the Basel II capitalization requirements. Under the parallel run, 
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Basel I.70 The primary difference between Basel I and II is the com-
plexity of the calculations used to determine adequate capitalization. 
For instance, Basel I assesses the same capitalization requirements 
against all unsecured corporate bonds and residential mortgages, re-
gardless of actual risk. Basel II calculates capital requirements on 
both the type of holding and the particular risks associated with that 
holding.71 For purposes of this Comment, Basel I and II create the 
same perverse incentives; Basel II merely provides a more nuanced 
calculation of net capital. 
 While commercial banks are still required to calculate minimum 
capital requirements under Basel I, the institutions most affected by 
the credit crisis have already moved to Basel II.72 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission allows investment banks to adopt Basel II’s 
capitalization requirements under the Consolidated Supervised Enti-
ty program.73 All of the largest investment banks, including Bear 
                                                                                                                     
each institution required to adopt Basel II must calculate net capital under both Basel I 
and II for one year prior to switching completely to Basel II requirements. See Press Re-
lease, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Dugan Tells International 
Bankers that Basel II U.S. Implementation on a Prudent, Deliberate Path (Mar. 3, 2008), 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-26.htm; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY & FED. RESERVE SYS., INTERAGENCY STATEMENT — U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF 
BASEL II ADVANCED APPROACHES FRAMEWORK: QUALIFICATION PROCESS 4 (2008), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2008/SR0804a1.pdf (describing paral-
lel run and implementation process). 
 70. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 
app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 app. A (2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 567 subpt. B (2008). See gener-
ally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1. 
 71. See Randall S. Kroszner, Member of the Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at the New York Banker Association Annual Washington Visit, Basel II Imple-
mentation in the United States (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/kroszner20070712a.htm. 
 72. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consol-
idated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 240) [hereinafter Alternative Net Capital Requirements], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.pdf (establishing Basel II as alternative for in-
vestment banks). As a note to the reader, the CSE program was eliminated in September 
2008 when all of the entities regulated under the program either collapsed or opted to be 
treated as Bank Holding Companies, which are regulated by the Federal Reserve. See 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/ 
2008-230.htm; see also Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Col-
lapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/ 
business/27sec.html. 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(7) (2008) (permitting broker-dealers to adopt Basel II 
guidelines for establishing minimum capital); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e (requiring that bro-
ker-dealers use alternate net capital requirements); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1g (providing 
conditions for broker-dealers to use the alternative Basel net capital requirements); see al-
so Alternative Net Capital Requirements, supra note 72 (adopting final rule that includes 
the SEC’s description of the alternative net capital program). 
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Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan, opted to use Basel II in-
stead of the default rules for determining net capital requirements.74 
 Both Basel Accords were designed to ensure financial stability by 
requiring banks and other financial institutions to maintain mini-
mum capital requirements, mandating supervisory review of capital 
adequacy, and requiring disclosures to ensure market discipline.75 
Under Basel II, the capital cushion a bank must maintain is deter-
mined by its actual risk exposure.76 However, capital constraints are 
determined against mark-to-market balance sheets,77 forcing firms to 
write down the value of their holdings as the market price for sub-
prime MBS fell. This reduced their total capital, forcing them to sell 
assets to maintain Basel capital requirements.78 This forced liquida-
tion further depressed market prices, requiring additional sales.79 
Once subprime MBS became sufficiently illiquid, firms were forced to 
sell otherwise unrelated assets in order to stay sufficiently capita-
lized, leading to problems in otherwise unrelated assets.80 For in-
                                                                                                                     
 74.  Regulation of Investment Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & 
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Bank., Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of 
Erik Sirri, Dir., Div. of Trading and Mkts., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
 75. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 2-3 (describing Basel’s 
three pillar structure); Implementing Basel, supra note 69; see also Conrad Bahlke & Ro-
bert Lewin, US Regulators Respond to Basel II, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2003, at 42, 43. 
 76. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 224; Kroszner, supra note 71; see also 
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1e, 240.15c3-1g. However, regardless of exposure, the broker-dealer 
must maintain tentative net capital of at least $1 billion and actual net capital of $500 mil-
lion. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(7)(i). 
 As an example of the detail required to compute net capital under Basel II, a firm’s 
Value at Risk model (a method of measuring risk for particular holdings) must incorporate: 
(A) Risks arising from the non-linear price characteristics of derivatives and 
the sensitivity of the market value of those positions to changes in the volatility 
of the derivatives’ underlying rates and prices; 
(B) Empirical correlations with and across risk factors or, alternatively, risk 
factors sufficient to cover all the market risk inherent in the positions in the 
proprietary or other trading accounts of the broker or dealer, including interest 
rate risk, equity price risk, foreign exchange risk, and commodity price risk; 
(C) Spread risk, where applicable, and segments of the yield curve sufficient to 
capture differences in volatility and imperfect correlation of rates along the 
yield curve for securities and derivatives that are sensitive to different interest 
rates; and  
(D) Specific risk for individual positions. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e(d)(2)(iv). 
 77. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(1) (2000); FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD 133-3 (2008). 
 78. See Harald Benink et al., On the Role of Regulatory Banking Capital, 17 FIN. MKTS., 
INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 85, 86 (2008) (discussing Basel II’s perverse result that banks must 
sell falling assets to maintain capital requirements); see also Guillaume Plantin et al., Mark-
ing to Market, Liquidity, and Financial Stability, 23 MONETARY & ECON. STUDIES 133, 149 
(2005) [hereinafter Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability] (describing how marking 
to market will require asset sales to satisfy minimum capital requirements). 
 79. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 213-14. 
 80. See Systemic Risk Hearings, supra note 7, at 48 (statement of Richard Booksta-
ber); George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk: Lessons from 
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stance, municipal bonds and auction-rate securities, traditionally 
cash equivalents, have both suffered liquidity problems unrelated to 
their fundamentals.81 
 While Basel II appears to reduce risk ex ante, it actually increases 
market instability during a crisis by requiring firms to maintain min-
imum collateral against market prices.82 The result is a negative 
price shock, which can create an endogenous feedback loop that 
creates linked cycles of write-downs and forced sales. While the Basel 
II framework has been criticized for its complexity and unintelligibil-
ity,83 Basel is inadequate not because of its opacity, but because of its 
failure to address the underlying externality. Basel attempts to mi-
cromanage balance sheets but fails to force firms to internalize the 
costs of their trading strategies. 
 Though highly leveraged private equity firms, such as hedge 
funds, were forced to sell unrelated assets to meet margin or colla-
teral calls when MBS collateral prices declined,84 this effect was less 
important than the distress of critical intermediaries, such as in-
vestment banks or securities brokers. Hedge funds are private in-
vestment vehicles created to avoid the regulations facing other finan-
cial entities.85 If investors understand the risks, there is nothing par-
ticularly problematic about high-risk strategies. Further, “[e]mpirical 
research supports focusing on the risk exposure of hedge fund coun-
terparties.”86 Because hedge funds are not publicly traded and gener-
ally not large enough to impact the larger economy, they were likely 
not a contributing factor to the systemic event we are now facing. In-
deed, the failure of three Bear Stearns hedge funds in August 2007 
did not cause an immediate disruption; the troubled investment bank 
did not collapse until nearly nine months later.87 
                                                                                                                     
Recent Events, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Third Q. 2000, at 9, 15, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/2000/3qep2.pdf.  
 81. See Dominic Elliot & Tom Fairless, Hardest-to-Value Assets Escalate, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE, Apr. 15, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120820511277913811.html; Michael 
A. Pollock, Munis Likely to Face Weakness, Volatility; Supply, Demand Thrown Off-Kilter 
by Credit Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2008, at C5. 
 82. See Rodrigo Cifuentes et al., Liquidity Risk and Contagion 32 (Bank of Eng., 
Working Paper No. 264, 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=824166. 
 83. See Nicholas Budd, What Basel II Means for Specialized Lending, 22 INT’L FIN. L. 
REV. 23, 23 (2003); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 224. 
 84. See Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 8 box 2. 
 85. Thomsen et al., supra note 18, at 543-44 (“[T]he term ‘hedge fund’ refers less to 
the hedging techniques that such funds have originally employed than it does to their 
present status as private and unregistered investment pools—so-called ‘alternative’ or  
‘non-traditional’ investments.”). 
 86. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 223. 
 87. See Timeline of a Crisis, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 17, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB120576387418941803.html (indicating that Bear Stearns liquidated three hedge 
funds on August 1, 2007, but did not fail until March 14, 2008). Similarly, the failure of 
Carlyle Capital Fund did not significantly affect the market. See infra text accompanying 
notes 98-100. 
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 These market liquidity crises result in firm-specific liquidity prob-
lems. Institutional investors rely on “short-term financing through 
borrowing on a secured basis” to fund illiquid positions.88 However, 
counterparties will either require additional collateral or simply 
refuse to lend against troubled assets in fear that they will be “stuck 
with assets that are dropping in market value in the event that bor-
rowers can’t repay them.”89 As market liquidity further decreases, 
firms become unwilling to lend on any terms out of fear for their  
own liquidity.90 
 Without access to capital funding, margin calls force firms to sell 
“assets into a falling market,”91 which further decreases prices, “set-
ting off a nasty spiral in which assets are unloaded into a declining 
market, placing even more downward pressure on values and leading 
more lenders to call in loans.”92 Fear of default leads to a functionally 
identical result in market liquidity: investors rush to close out posi-
tions, forcing the firm to default or liquidate its entire portfolio.93 
Given the complex interdependent counterparty relationships in cap-
ital markets, liquidating a major institution could lead to defaults in 
affected institutions or to additional panics.94 
 The collapse of Bear Stearns shows the effects of liquidity con-
cerns. Lenders refused to extend credit during a “crisis of confi-
dence,” and Bear Stearns could not fund its positions or post addi-
tional collateral.95 Its counterparties declared default and moved to 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Press Release, Letter from Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to 
Dr. Nout Wellink, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices for 
Managing Liquidity in Banking Organizations (Mar. 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48.htm. 
 89. Serena Ng & Randall Smith, Another Source of Quick Cash Dries up: Firms Re-
think Reliance on ‘Repo’ Financing as Conditions Tighten, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at 
C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120571167285740199.html. 
 90. Kaufman, supra note 80, at 15; Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
 91. See Kambhu et al., supra note 3, at 8 box 2. 
 92. Peter A. McKay, Mounting Liquidation Fears Squeeze U.S. Stock Market, WALL 
ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB120480186203616481.html. 
 93. See Viral V. Acharya & Stephen Schaefer, Liquidity Risk and Correlation Risk: 
Implications for Risk Management 9-13 (Sept. 8, 2006) (unpublished draft), available at 
http://www.greta.it/credit/credit2006/talk/Tuesday_26/1_Acharya.pdf; see also Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 213-14. 
 94. Kaufman, supra note 80, at 14-15 (describing how systemic events may be trans-
mitted via counterparty relationships); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 213-15 
(describing how chain of failures could occur). 
 95. Cox, supra note 88. The SEC has raised concerns that several firms short sold 
Bear Stearns stock and subsequently spread rumors about the firm’s solvency. In response, 
the SEC issued an emergency rule, which prohibited “ ‘naked’ short selling” of certain fi-
nancial institutions, including Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers. Emergency Order 
Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Ac-
tion to Respond to Market Developments, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58166, 73 
Fed. Reg. 42,379 (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ 
34-58166.pdf; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58190, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,837 (July 18, 
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seize collateral. However, “the firm had a capital cushion well above 
what is required to meet supervisory standards calculated using the 
Basel II standard.”96 Bear Stearns was not insolvent; rather, coun-
terparties rushed to close out positions in fear of impending insolven-
cy.97 Similarly, the Carlyle Capital Group collapsed not from insol-
vency, but from panicked counterparties.98 Carlyle Capital was a 
highly leveraged hedge fund consisting exclusively of AAA GSE se-
curities.99 These securities are traditionally very safe and considered 
guaranteed by the government; liquidity concerns, however, de-
pressed their market price. As Carlyle’s asset values declined, lend-
ers requested more collateral. Due to its leveraged position, Carlyle 
could not obtain funding and failed to meet margin calls. Its lenders 
seized their collateral and began auctioning its assets; the firm an-
nounced it would liquidate.100 
 Importantly, each firm’s behavior was individually rational. It 
was in a firm’s best interest to sell its subprime exposures at the top 
of the market. Similarly, Bear Stearns’ counterparties had clear in-
centives to be the first to close out their positions. The systemic prob-
lem is that firms have only the incentive to maximize their own wel-
fare and, hence, price only the internal costs and benefits of any 
risk.101 However, this problem is not novel; it is an archetypical tra-
gedy of the commons. The proper regulatory mechanism is simply one 
which forces firms to internalize the costs they impose on the market. 
                                                                                                                     
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58190.pdf (amending order); see 
also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Enhances Investor Protections Against 
Naked Short Selling (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/ 
2008-143.htm. The order expired on August 12, 2008. See Order Extending Emergency Or-
der Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 58248, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,257 (July 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58248.pdf (extending effective date of emergency 
order). The S.E.C. later adopted a limited short-selling proscription that extends securities 
fraud liability to persons who deceive a purchaser about their ability or intention to deliver 
the security and then actually fail to deliver the security at settlement. ‘‘Naked’’ Short Sell-
ing Antifraud Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,666 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 96. Cox, supra note 88. 
 97. Id. (“The market rumors about Bear Stearns [sic] liquidity problems became  
self-fulfilling.”). 
 98. See Carlyle’s Comeuppance: Debt Fund CCC Placed Bet on AAA Mortgage Bonds 
and a Load of Leverage, WALL ST. J, Mar. 7, 2008, at C12, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120486025559518793.html; Peter Lattman, Carlyle Capital 
to Liquidate What Is Left, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A12 [hereinafter Lattman, Liqui-
date], available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120572975692141167.html; Peter Latt-
man, Credit Crunch: Carlyle Capital Nears Collapse as Accord Can’t Be Reached, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 13, 2008, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB120537974320632835.html. 
 99. See Peter Lattman & Randall Smith, Carlyle Capital Aims to Halt a Meltdown; 
Leveraged Vehicle Seeks ‘Stretchout’ on Loans; In a ‘Purgatory Age’, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 
2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120487123309819271.html. 
 100. Lattman, Liquidate, supra note 98. 
 101. Rajan, supra note 18, at 514-18, 523-24; Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 
206; Brown et al., supra note 58, at 14-15. 
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IV.   WHAT’S THE PROBLEM? 
A.   The Economics of Regulation 
 A legal regulatory regime presupposes a market failure. Absent 
transaction costs, default legal rules would be irrelevant; rational in-
dividuals would bargain to produce efficient outcomes.102 However, 
once market frictions are introduced, parties will bargain only if the 
bargaining produces value that exceeds the cost of transacting.103 
Regulation can improve the market outcome only if transaction costs 
are limiting otherwise mutually beneficial trades.104 However, regu-
lation is not costless, and the decision to impose liability or proscribe 
conduct will also impose costs elsewhere in the market.105 Regulators 
must decide “whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater 
than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stop-
ping the action which produces the harm.”106 Efficient regulations 
will assign liability (or proscribe conduct) to the party able to miti-
gate the harm at the least cost. Because we assume economic actors 
are rational,107 individuals will price regulatory costs resulting in op-
timal abatement and social efficiency. 
 Sound regulatory policy attempts to minimize fraud and force 
firms to internalize external costs.108 Market failures (or imperfec-
tions) include monopoly, underproduction of public goods, asymme-
tric information, and moral hazard.109 Without an externality or in-
formational asymmetry to improve upon, any regulation is going to 
be superfluous or, worse, prevent socially beneficial trades. 
B.   Financial Pollution 
 The subprime crisis is decidedly more complex than the conven-
tional narrative implies. The problem is not that mortgages de-
faulted, but that firms’ incentives led to overinvestment in these se-
                                                                                                                     
 102. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 205-06. See generally DAVID P. 
BARON, BUSINESS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 323-61 (5th ed. 2006); R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 103. Coase, supra note 102, at 16 (“[T]he costs of reaching the same result by altering 
and combining rights through the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement 
of rights, and the greater value of production which it would bring, may never  
be achieved.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 209-10 (“Because regulation can be cost-
ly, efficiency . . . demands that the costs of regulation do not exceed its benefits.”). 
 106. Coase, supra note 102, at 27. 
 107. See DINO FALASCHETTI & MICHAEL ORLANDO, MONEY, FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2008) (discussing economic assumption of rationali-
ty). For a defense of rational choice theory against behavioral economic critiques, see Ri-
chard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.  
1551 (1998). 
 108. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 205-06. 
 109. BARON, supra note 102, at 332-38. 
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curities. Systemic risk arises because market participants price only 
the internal costs and benefits of any transaction, resulting in social-
ly inefficient investment strategies. An efficient regulatory response 
must address this moral hazard and disincentivize inefficient gover-
nance and investment decisions.110 
 While commentators have identified this externality, they have 
failed to apply this insight to their regulatory proposals.111 All of the 
hallmarks of systemic collapse—excessive risk, high leverage, and 
subsequent panic112—stem from the failure of firms to internalize the 
systemic costs of their actions. Addressing the symptoms of this ex-
ternality with liquidity provisions, capital requirements, or leverage 
constraints will not align the incentives of firms with the socially 
beneficial outcome. The primary contribution of this Comment is to 
show a mechanism whereby regulators can reduce the incentives 
that lead to systemic risk instead of legislating around the problem. 
 Individually maximizing incentives will lead firms to take incre-
mentally higher risk to outperform competitors. This results in a race 
to the risk-management bottom, as firms increase risk exposure and 
leverage to outperform their peers.113 However, “[t]he greater flow of 
funds into the riskier asset classes . . . further contributes to the 
compression of yield spreads, inducing migration yet further down 
the risk spectrum.”114 As firms attempt to increase returns, they are 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See Part 2: Current Trends in Economic Research on Systemic Risk, FRBNY 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 17, 20 (2007). 
 111. Previous proposals focus on particular symptoms of this externality. See, e.g., 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69 (creating minimum capital re-
quirements); PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 52, at 31-32 (recommending in-
creased disclosure and capital requirements); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2 (re-
commending liquidity provider of last resort). 
 112. See Rajan, supra note 18, at 501-02, 517-18 (describing how periods of low interest 
rates lead firms to increase leverage and risk, which can lead to the realization of tail risk); 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 214-15 (describing how panic can initiate sys-
temic crisis); Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, 10-12, 31-32 
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/adrian/ 
LiquidityLeverage25Sep2007.pdf (describing how economic booms lead firms to increase 
leverage and risk, which must be corrected by liquidating assets during a downturn). 
 113. Rajan, supra note 18, at 501; Brown et al., supra note 58, at 14-15. 
 114. Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability, supra note 78, at 134; see also 
Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67, at 32 (discussing how, as mark to market prices 
increase equity, bank managers have incentives to increase leverage). This is apparently 
what preceded the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). After the success of 
LTCM’s convergence strategies, “players with similar trading strategies crowded into the 
market, the spreads narrowed on the favored convergence trades, eroding the profit mar-
gin for all the players.” See Jon Danielsson & Hyun Song Shin, Endogenous Risk 14 (Sept. 
21, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://hyunsongshin.org/www/risk1.pdf. 
This forced LTCM into riskier markets to increase returns. When the market reversed, the 
fund collapsed. Id. at 14-15. See generally PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 52; 
Thomsen et al., supra note 18, at 545-47. 
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forced to invest in increasingly riskier assets. Problematically, it is 
less profitable to engage in socially optimal investment strategies.115 
 As investment strategies force firms into higher risk and less liq-
uid markets, firms will sell “at a much higher price” out of “appre-
hens[ion] about the effect of other traders bailing out.”116 Inefficient 
investment strategies create socially inefficient selling strategies: as 
risk appetite increases on the upside of the market, loss aversion in-
creases on the downside, increasing the market susceptibility to pan-
ic.117 The externalities are the same: an efficient regulatory response 
need not require firms to irrationally hold falling assets; by realign-
ing incentives on the buy side, the incentive to panic will be efficient-
ly regulated on the downside as well. 
1.   A Model of Systemic Risk 
 Procyclical trends increase systemic risk. That is, systemic sus-
ceptibility increases on the upside of the financial cycle. For example, 
the subprime crisis, the tech bubble, the 1987 stock market crash, 
and the Great Depression all followed periods of strong growth.118 In-
terest rates tend to fall during periods of strong economic growth. As 
interest rates fall, competitive pressures forcing managers to in-
crease risk are compounded because low risk investments will not 
provide sufficient returns.119 Firms must seek out exceedingly risky 
positions to meet minimum returns; managers face similar pressures 
to ensure that they do not underperform their peers.120 As interest 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Part 2: Current Trends in Economic Research on Systemic Risk, supra note 110, at 
20 (“If it is costly to hold liquid assets in order to be a buyer and to provide liquidity in a 
market crash, why would anyone choose to do it?”). 
 116. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Black Holes 19-20 (Cowles Founda-
tion, Yale University, Discussion Paper No. 1434, 2003), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=446600; see also Plantin et al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 
supra note 47, at 439-40 (“As the liquidity of the asset dries up, marking-to-market be-
comes significantly more inefficient than the historical cost regime because strategic con-
cerns overwhelm fundamental analysis.”). 
 117. Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67, at 5 (describing how external effects are 
transferred “on the way up” and “on the way down”); see also Adrian & Shin, supra note 
112, at 32 (describing how incentives to increase leverage during economic booms sow the 
“seeds of the subsequent downturn”). 
 118. Eugene N. White, Bubbles and Busts: The 1990s in the Mirror of the 1920s, at 5, 7 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12138, 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12138.pdf; see also Rajan, supra note 18, at 501-02 (“An envi-
ronment of low interest rates following a period of high rates is particularly problematic, 
for not only does the incentive of some participants to ‘search for yield’ go up, but also asset 
prices are given the initial impetus, which can lead to an upward spiral, creating the con-
ditions for a sharp and messy realignment.”). 
 119. Rajan, supra note 18, at 518 (“When risk free returns are high, compensation is 
high even if the fund takes on little risk, while when risk free returns are low the fund may 
not even exceed the minimum return if it takes little risk.”); see also Plantin et al., Liquidi-
ty, and Financial Stability, supra note 78, at 134 (discussing how low interest rates and 
compressed yield spreads force firms to take on risky investment strategies).  
 120. Rajan, supra note 18, at 514-19; see also Kambhu at al., supra note 3, at 10-11, 13.  
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rates fall, investors become increasingly confident in market stability 
and feel more confident taking on more tail risk.121 However, these 
assets produce precisely the type of risk that typifies a liquidity cri-
sis: rare but devastating losses that cause traders to bail out of posi-
tions at higher loss levels than is socially optimal. 
 Further, a firm’s mark-to-market balance sheets expand during 
periods of strong growth. Firms must then increase borrowing to 
maintain minimum leverage ratios.122 As with risk appetite, “leve-
rage is pro-cyclical.”123 Adrian and Shin hypothesize that, as balance 
sheets expand and borrowing increases, firms “increas[e] trading po-
sitions through the chasing of yield.”124 This increased leverage is “in-
timately tied to the short-term incentives facing the [firms’] man-
agement.”125 Increasing leverage and chasing yield are two aspects of 
the same returns-driven race to the bottom. 
 Importantly, this is precisely the set of preconditions for a system-
ic event outlined above. If there is a market event, the systemic 
threat is highest at this point. Further, negative mark-to-market-
price shocks will result in instantaneously higher leverage. As with 
Carlyle Capital, counterparties demand more collateral, but the firm 
will be unable to borrow to meet margin calls as its leverage is 
maxed out. If, because of liquidity concerns, the firm is unable to sell 
its assets for a fair price, it will default, resulting in liquidation by  
its counterparties. 
 Command and control regulations, such as the Basel Accords, ac-
tually increase financial instability during a market shock.126 Under 
Basel II’s Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach, firms must main-
tain minimum capital requirements with respect to individual risk 
exposures.127 The capitalization requirements are determined by a 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Rajan, supra note 18, at 518 (finding “[s]imple proxies such as the VIX index for 
the risk aversion of financial markets in the USA do seem to be positively correlated with 
the level of short-term interest rates”). The VIX is the “weighted average of the implied vo-
latility in the S&P500 index options.” See Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 27. Colloquial-
ly, the VIX measures how much traders expect the market to fluctuate and, consequently, 
how confident they are in risky positions. Id. 
 122. See Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 8-9; Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 25-
32; Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67. 
 123. Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 8; Greenlaw et al., supra note 17, at 26, 29-30. 
 124. Adrian & Shin, supra note 112, at 30. 
 125. Shin, Risk & Liquidity, supra note 67, at 32. 
 126. See Benink et al., supra note 78; Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability, 
supra note 78, at 149; Cifuentes et al., supra note 82, at 32. 
 127. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 52-119; see also 17 
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e (2008); Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy 
Framework — Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3; 12 
C.F.R. pt. 208, 225, 12 C.F.R. pt. 325; 12 C.F.R. pt. 559, 560, 563, 567). The Basel Commit-
tee permits banks to adopt either the advanced IRB approach or a standardized approach, 
which is similar to the original Basel requirements. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 19. However, the United States is requiring its large or in-
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firm’s credit risk, operational risk, and market risk.128 Capitalization 
levels are dependent on not only the probability of default and loss 
given default of each holding, but also on the form that each holding 
takes: for example, there are different functions for determining the 
minimum capital required for corporate debt, derivatives, and real 
estate exposures.129 Basel also requires firms to account for their off-
balance sheet holdings.130 The Basel calculations are complex, and 
some have called them incomprehensible.131 However, the problem is 
not their complexity, but their failure to address the underlying  
moral hazard. 
 While Basel may appear to limit risk taking ex ante, it produces 
perverse incentives in the event of an asset shock. Once the price of 
an asset is reduced, firms have the incentive to move it off of their 
balance sheets to maintain minimum capital levels; as firms sell 
more assets, however, the market price is depressed, creating a nega-
tive feedback loop “that far outweighs the initial shock.”132 Basel’s 
micromanaged approach legislates around the problem without ad-
dressing misaligned incentives. Firm-specific capital requirements do 
not find the least cost mitigator; Basel simply requires firms to mani-
pulate balance sheets to maintain adequate collateralization. The ef-
fect is that, while firms must maintain capitalization, every firm still 
has the incentive to maximize returns by entering into increasingly 
risky transactions. The systemic externality is simply not addressed. 
 An efficient regulation must address the fact that socially efficient 
investment strategies are not individually maximizing. Firms’ incen-
tives must be aligned with society’s, or else regulation is necessarily 
going to legislate around the issue. 
                                                                                                                     
ternationally active banks to comply with the IRB approach. Risk-Based Capital Stan-
dards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework — Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. at 69,289-90. 
 128. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69. 
 129. Id. at 52, 63-86. 
 130. Id.; see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1g(a)(3) (2008) (“The ultimate holding company 
shall compute an allowance for credit risk for certain assets on the consolidated balance 
sheet and certain off-balance sheet items, including loans and loan commitments, expo-
sures due to derivatives contracts, structured financial products, and other extensions of 
credit, and credit substitutes . . . .”). 
 131. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 224 (quoting Susan Schmidt Bies, Gov-
ernor, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Basel II Developments in the United 
States, Remarks Before the Institute of International Bankers (Sept. 26, 2005)). 
 132. Plantin et al., Liquidity, and Financial Stability, supra note 78, at 151; see also 
Morris & Shin, supra note 116, at 2-3 (“[S]elling pressure[s] sets of further downward 
pressure on asset prices, which induces a further round of selling, and so on.”); Plantin et 
al., Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, supra note 47, at 439 (“[M]arking-to-market tends to ampl-
ify the movements in asset prices relative to their fundamental values in bad states of the 
world.”); Shin, Risk and Liquidity, supra note 67, at 23 (describing how solvency con-
straints can induce endogenous liquidity crises). 
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2.   The Insufficiency of a Liquidity Provider 
 Many scholars have recommended creating a formal liquidity pro-
vider (lender) of last resort.133 A private or government-sponsored 
entity that provides liquidity during a crisis may avoid liquidity spil-
lover by allowing firms to unwind troubled positions, avoiding sys-
temic failure.134 However, a liquidity provider is necessarily an ex 
post remedy and does not address the underlying externality. 
 While Professor Schwarcz recognizes that a liquidity provider may 
foster a sense of safety that encourages risk taking, he argues that 
refusing to spell out in advance whether the liquidity provider will 
assist in any given downturn will create enough constructive ambi-
guity135 to minimize moral hazard. Assuming arguendo that he is cor-
rect, this approach will necessarily not reduce systemic risk, but will 
merely avoid systemic failure. A liquidity provider alone is, therefore, 
not an optimal regulatory response. 
 Further, though a liquidity provider of last resort serves socially 
beneficial ends, the Federal Reserve is acting in that capacity al-
ready. The Federal Reserve recently created a short term lending fa-
cility for AAA securities as collateral to provide liquidity to troubled 
firms.136 Further, in fear of institutional failure, the Federal Reserve 
guaranteed Bear Stearns’ liabilities in conjunction with J.P. Mor-
gan’s private sector acquisition.137 Though the Federal Reserve’s au-
thority to enter into these transactions is unclear,138 such jurisdic-
                                                                                                                     
 133. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 225-30, 241-49. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 226; see also Partnoy, supra note 53, at 785. 
 136. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080311a.htm [hereinafter Board of 
Governors Press Release]. 
 137. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 14, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080314a.htm; see also Neil 
Irwin & David Cho, Fed Takes Broad Action to Avert Financial Crisis: Central Bank Backs 
Sale of Bear Sterns, Cuts Key Interest Rate, Extends New Credit, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 
2008, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/ 
16/AR2008031601672.html. 
 138. The Federal Reserve may open its discount window and lend to any firm in “un-
usual and exigent circumstances” and has been traditionally thought of as a lender of last 
resort. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006); Actions by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in Re-
sponse to Liquidity Pressures in Financial Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 12-13, 16 (2008) [hereinafter Actions by the Fed-
eral Reserve Hearings], available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ 
OpgStmtGeithner4308Testimony.pdf (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Pres. & CEO, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (noting that Federal Reserve is a lender of last resort 
but that exercising such authority is an “extraordinary step”). However, it is unclear how 
far this authority actually extends. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 230 & n.232 
(noting that the Federal Reserve’s ability to act as a lender of last resort “is ambiguous un-
der existing law” and that it likely lacks the authority to purchase securities outright). For 
instance, the Federal Reserve is restricted in its ability to acquire equity interests in firms, 
but it may freely purchase Treasury Bills. Actions by the Federal Reserve Hearings, supra, 
at 13 (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Pres. & CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
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tional doubt is likely the highest form of constructive ambiguity. Ad-
ditionally, when profitable, the private sector has bailed out troubled 
firms. Citadel Investment Group bailed Amaranth and Sowood, two 
troubled hedge funds, when collapse was imminent.139 Similarly, as 
the credit crisis unfolded, the Carlyle Group quickly formed a fund to 
“do everything from investing in publicly traded bonds and bank 
loans to purchasing ailing companies outright.”140 
 Finally, a responsible liquidity provider can lend only against as-
sets which are truly illiquid and not actually worthless. For instance, 
the Federal Reserve loaned not against subprime MBS, but only 
against assets which were practically guaranteed.141 No one has come 
forward to lend against assets which may be truly impaired, such as 
subordinated tranches or second-lien securities.142 A liquidity provid-
er will be unable to lend against assets which are complex enough to 
make determining the worth cost prohibitive. 
3.   Increased Disclosure Would Be Ineffective 
 Systemic risk is a result of incentives which induce excessive risk 
taking, even in the presence of full disclosure; therefore, despite its 
prevalence in other financial regulation, additional disclosure will be 
ineffective.143 The problem is not that firms do not realize the risks 
they are undertaking, but that maximizing investment strategies re-
quires them to take those risks.144 Firms have no incentive to reduce 
                                                                                                                     
York) (“We did not have the authority to acquire an equity interest in either Bear or 
JPMorgan Chase . . . .”); Jon Hilsenrath & Liz Rappaport, Fed Weighs Idea of Buying Trea-
suries as Focus Shifts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at A4 (noting that the Federal Reserve 
“has clear legal authority to buy government debt”). However, regulators appear free to 
liberally construe the power granted by section 343. The Federal Reserve’s loan to AIG is 
technically a secured loan, but it is often characterized as an equity purchase. See Matthew 
Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject 
Cash as Credit Dries up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (noting that the AIG 
transaction is a secured loan but that it effectively transfers a majority interest to  
the government). 
 139. Systemic Risk Hearings, supra note 7, at 51 (statement of Richard Bookstaber); 
Jenny Anderson, Hedge Fund Forced to Sell Its Portfolio, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, July 31, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/31/business/31hedge.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 140. Peter Lattman, Carlyle Fund to Target Distressed Assets; New Vehicle Enters a 
Crowded Field; Much Less Leverage, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2008, at C3, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120753238767993945.html. 
 141. See Board of Governors Press Release, supra note 136. 
 142. As late as February 2009, it was impossible to properly value securitized mort-
gage assets because the market had been almost completely frozen for over six months. See 
Robert C. Pozen, Op-Ed., How to Value Toxic Bank Assets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at 
A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120753238767993945.html. 
 143. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 218 (“[I]ndividual market participants 
who fully understand that risk will be motivated to protect themselves but not the system 
as a whole.”); see also Brown et al., supra note 58, at 15 (“Indeed, even if markets enjoy 
complete information about a firm’s governance decisions, they will only price the internal 
costs and benefits of those decisions.”). 
 144. See Rajan, supra note 18, at 514-19. 
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returns to make the financial system marginally more stable for oth-
er firms engaging in risky investment strategies. 
 Further, firms are provided the balance sheets of their counter-
parties. The problem is not that firms are unaware of systemic risk, 
but that it is individually less profitable to factor the cost to the sys-
tem into a firm’s decisionmaking calculus. Accordingly, increased 
disclosure should not be expected to result in firm-level changes that 
would diminish systemic risk.145 
4.   Internalizing Costs to the System 
 An optimal solution to systemic risk must reduce the impediments 
to firms engaging in mutually and socially beneficial risk manage-
ment. This is precisely the same externality produced by environ-
mental pollutants. Each firm imposes costs on the environment be-
cause it prices only the costs and benefits of production internally, 
resulting in socially detrimental pollution levels.146 Absent transac-
tion costs, firms could bargain with each other to produce the effi-
cient levels of pollution. However, “[t]he costs would be exorbitant if 
all these individuals attempted to reach an agreement,”147 and the 
cost of pollution controls would reduce the firm’s profitability. The 
result is that without regulation, a socially detrimental amount of 
pollution is produced. 
 From a regulatory perspective, excess systemic risk and excess 
pollution are the same problem. The solution lies in forcing firms to 
internalize the effects of their decisions, reducing the harm to the so-
cially optimal level. Tradable permit systems have proven effective at 
reducing pollution to socially beneficial levels, forcing firms to inter-
nalize the cost of their emissions.148 Such a system may provide an ef-
ficient way to limit systemic risk while allowing private ordering to 
efficiently allocate risk to the firms best able to manage it.149 Though 
this proposal will face significant obstacles in implementation, the 
underlying incentive structure is efficient. 
 A tradable permit system150 sets the total market allowance of the 
regulated good to a socially efficient level; however, because the per-
mits can be traded, firms can allocate use to the most productive  
                                                                                                                     
 145. Disclosure in other ways (i.e., more information) may lead to new avenues of regu-
lation, but disclosure itself will not serve as effective regulation. 
 146. BARON, supra note 102, at 363-92 (“[S]ocial efficiency requires that the polluter 
and those affected by the pollution externality take into account both the harm and the 
costs of abatement.”). 
 147. Id. at 367. 
 148. See generally KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, THE WORLD BANK, STATE AND 
TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET (2007) [hereinafter CARBON MARKET] (providing general 
discussion of carbon trading markets). 
 149. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68. 
 150. “Tradable permit” and “cap and trade” are synonymous. 
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user.151 This type of system is optimal because activity is limited to 
the efficient level, but firms are able to trade allowances to meet 
“compliance requirements at the lowest possible cost.”152 Social effi-
ciency results because firms can bargain over the ability to engage in 
the regulated activity over the efficient level. Effectively, firms are 
forced to internalize the cost of the harm because the individually 
maximizing strategy prices the cost of permitting to continue engag-
ing in the activity. The firm best able to abate will reduce its activity 
and sell its unused permits for any price higher than the profit it 
would gain from incrementally increasing its usage of the regulated 
good. As a corollary, a firm that cannot abate for the least cost will 
purchase permits for any price below the profit it would lose from 
abating the activity. 
 The socially efficient outcome will result whether the permits are 
allocated for no charge or auctioned to the highest bidder at the out-
set.153 For example, if a firm is allocated permits, it can abate the ac-
tivity and sell to a nonabating competitor for any price between its 
cost of abatement and its competitor; if the permits are auctioned in-
itially, the nonabating firm will purchase for any price below the cost 
of abating. Initial allocation does affect the distribution of wealth, 
but, in either scenario, both firms price the cost to the system, and 
the regulated activity is abated by the firm that can do so at the  
least cost.154 
 By limiting the total pollution allowed each year, firms have the 
incentive to efficiently reduce the emissions and profit of their mar-
gin of abatement efficiency by selling permits to other firms. In ef-
fect, a tradable permit system realigns firms’ profit maximizing in-
centives with the socially efficient level of pollution. Because each 
firm can make an arbitrage profit by reducing its cost of abatement, 
firms have prosocial incentives. For example, allowances under the 
Clean Air Act reduced sulfur dioxide emissions from coal plants by 
forty-five percent and at half the cost of comparable command-and-
control regulation.155 The EPA implemented a similar system, which 
reduced nitrogen oxide emissions by over sixty percent from  
peak levels.156 
                                                                                                                     
 151. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68 (discussing tradable permit mechanisms for pol-
lutants); CARBON MARKET, supra note 148, at 11 (discussing allowance-based tradable 
permit markets). 
 152. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68. 
 153. Id. at 367 (“With any of these allocations, social efficiency can be achieved pro-
vided the permits can be traded”). See generally Coase, supra note 102. 
 154. See BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68. 
 155. Id.; see also Sulfur Dioxide Allowance System, 40 C.F.R. § 73 (2008). 
 156. BARON, supra note 102, at 367-68; see also Acid Rain Nitrogen Oxides Emission 
Reduction Program, 40 C.F.R. § 76 (2008). 
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 Though the incentives are similar, systemic risk does not perfectly 
map onto environmental regulation. The most problematic aspect is 
the dimension of regulation. For pollution, a regulator can easily de-
termine what is to be regulated; for systemic risk, the activity that 
must be abated is less clear. In some aspects, however, systemic risk 
regulation is less difficult to implement. Implementing financial reg-
ulation is not saddled with the costs of construction or installation 
that may hamper pollution controls. Further, financial regulation 
should be easier to monitor. Once the relevant dimension is deter-
mined, monitoring could easily be automated provided that firms dis-
close accurate information. Finally, because financial regulation is 
virtual, the efficient level of risk can be modified without cost, simi-
lar to interest rates, if initial estimates are incorrect or innovation 
shifts the efficient level of risk. 
 The primary impediment to implementing such a system is quan-
tifying the efficient level of risk. While resolving this issue is far 
beyond the scope of this Comment, the computations are clearly not 
impossible. Both Basel I and II presume that regulators can deter-
mine efficient levels of risk for large financial firms. If we accept that 
Basel can quantify risk to acceptable degrees of error, we need only 
modify the way that capitalization ratios are allocated in order to 
create tradable risk credits. 
 By reframing the problem, regulators can sensibly ask who can 
mitigate systemic risk for the least cost. By identifying the problem, 
we can ask which party in the externality can reduce risk at the low-
est cost to society. In a frictionless market, we would expect to see 
market participants bargaining to reduce risk. However, the transac-
tion costs of such a bargain are clearly prohibitive. Systemic risk 
must be addressed at the firm level by forcing market participants to 
bear the cost of their investment strategies. 
5.   A New Capital Adequacy 
 The correct dimension to regulate must be one that accurately in-
ternalizes the systemic cost of any decision. However, systemic risk is 
produced along a number of dimensions, such as leverage, liquidity, 
and size. Regulating any one of these dimensions would be insuffi-
cient to limit systemic risk. A large, leveraged firm pursuing low risk 
investments will present little systemic risk. Similarly, a large firm 
with low leverage will not threaten the system no matter how risky 
its positions are. Finally, firms with sufficiently small holdings will 
not present systemic risks no matter how risky or leveraged they are. 
 However, modifying Basel II’s advanced capital adequacy frame-
work will adequately capture all of the relevant dimensions. Instead 
of using the Basel II requirements to set firm-specific leverage and 
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capital levels, regulators could use the Basel formulas to determine 
firm-specific indices which could be bought and sold in increments. 
As noted above, the existence of the Basel Accords presumes that the 
calculations are not impossible or excessively arbitrary. By setting 
the total systemic risk at the socially efficient level, firms could bar-
gain to increase their individual index, either through total size, le-
verage, or risk exposure. Basel II requirements are cognizant of the 
size of the firm and minimum capitalization requirements and also 
control for leverage.157 Further, the IRB approach requires firms to 
impose liquidity haircuts on illiquid assets.158 Basel II measures the 
right dimensions; it simply does not implement them in a way that 
changes firms’ inefficient incentives. Fundamentally, Basel ignores 
the externality underlying systemic events: it does not force firms to 
internalize the systemic costs of their decisions. The result is that 
each firm still has the incentive to take as much risk as its capital 
constraints will allow. 
 If we accept that the IRB index can serve as a rough proxy for sys-
temic risk, we need only allow firms to bargain for the right to exceed 
individual risk levels. The Federal Reserve can determine, based on 
the combined size of the largest institutions’ balance sheets, a capita-
lization rate sufficient to ensure financial stability for the entire 
market. Firms can then trade credits to determine how that capitali-
zation is allocated.159 Exactly how this index would be determined is 
outside the scope of this Comment; the basic dimensions, however, 
are already present under the Basel framework. Firms that are best 
able to reduce risk will be able to do so and profit from selling their 
unused risk. The socially efficient strategy and the individually max-
imizing strategies will be aligned. 
 If the Basel formulas can be adopted so that the level of capitali-
zation reflects the total balance sheets of all regulated firms, firms 
may then trade the right to engage in investment strategies that 
would exceed their capital constraints. Firms can increase returns by 
either buying risk credits or reducing illiquid positions, allowing le-
verage to fall against increasing balance sheets and selling credits. 
Here, the risk-preferring firm can continue high-risk investment 
strategies, but in doing so, it must price the costs to the system. The 
                                                                                                                     
 157. Implementing Basel, supra note 69 (discussing how U.S. implementation of Basel 
II retains the leverage ratio found in Basel I). 
 158. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 69, at 31-36 (providing for-
mula for determining liquidity discounts); see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e(b)(3) (2008) (re-
quiring liquidity to be taken into account when evaluating the market risk for any  
particular holding). 
 159. For instance, the E.P.A establishes accounts for all regulated firms to “account 
and allocate” allowance credits. See 40 C.F.R. § 73.31. These accounts are then used to 
transfer credits between firms. See 40 C.F.R. §73.50. 
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increased cost of pursuing high-yield investments will provide a dis-
incentive to pursuing inefficient trading strategies. 
 Risk-averse firms have the incentive to pursue less risky strate-
gies but remain competitive by selling unused risk credits. These 
firms will become less leveraged and less exposed to high-risk mar-
kets, reducing the total systemic risk. As there are fewer firms pur-
suing the same high-risk investment, spreads will not narrow as 
quickly. Firms will have less incentive to travel down the risk conti-
nuum, and the total risk exposure should decline, even without the 
internalization provided by limiting borrowing. 
 The result will be a bifurcation of the market into risk-taking 
firms and risk-avoiding firms. Risk-taking firms can still pursue 
high-yield investments, but in the event of a market shock, risk-
avoiding firms will have liquid balance sheets and the ability to en-
gage in for-profit bailouts. By realigning incentives, the market can 
effectively regulate itself during liquidity panics. 
 The implementation of a cap and trade will raise some difficulties. 
First, the proper scope of the regulations must be determined. Should 
all institutions be covered or only those with balance sheets above a 
certain threshold? Similarly, should hedge funds be regulated or only 
publicly traded funds? Though hedge funds have been criticized,160 
they do not generally pose significant systemic threats. While hedge 
funds do not publicly disclose their trading strategies, counterparties 
are given disclosures that are detailed enough to inform their lending 
decisions.161 Long Term Capital Management’s162 failure was not de-
vastating because of its “status as a hedge fund but [because of] the 
sheer size of its exposure to other institutions.”163 A prudent regula-
tion would likewise exempt all funds below a certain size, regardless 
of their legal structure.164 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See Jenny Strasburg, Legislators Seek Hedge-Fund Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
2, 2009, at C2, available at http://sec.online.wsj.com/article/SB123353873110737937.html 
(noting several senators have proposed legislation mandating hedge fund registration to 
“to help prevent market catastrophes and investor fraud”); see also Hedge Fund 
Transparency Act, S. 344, 111th Cong. (2009); 155 CONG. REC. S1059 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 
2009) (statement of Sen. Levin).  
 161. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 218 (“[C]ounterparties already demand, 
and usually receive, disclosure to the extent it helps them assess the merits of their in-
vestments, qua investments.”). 
 162. See supra note 114 for a brief discussion of LCTM’s failure. 
 163. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 2, at 203. 
 164. See generally Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation 
by Size, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 657 (2008) (arguing the size of hedge funds should be regulated 
by restricting the ability of banks and financial intermediaries to contribute capital to pri-
vate investment firms). 
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 Further, it is important to note that the ideal level of systemic 
risk is not zero.165 The ideal level of systemic risk is the level at which 
additional reduction of risk would not offset the possible lost finan-
cial gains. While quantifying systemic risk will be empirically and 
mathematically difficult, regulators are not beginning from a blank 
slate. The Basel Accords are premised on the ability to quantify the 
ideal rate of capitalization to ensure financial stability. Further, sev-
eral academics have attempted to model or quantify systemic risk.166 
If we can sensibly talk about quantifying the risk of terrorist at-
tack,167 producing a workable estimate of systemic risk is well within 
our capabilities. Insurance companies routinely quantify the risk of 
rare events, such as hurricanes, floods, or the chance someone will 
hit a hole-in-one during a golf tournament. While exactly determin-
ing an ideal level of risk is unlikely, producing a liberal estimate is 
possible. As regulators evaluate the effectiveness of the proposal, the 
allowed level of risk can be revised with little cost. 
 Finally, an enacted system would have to determine how to allo-
cate these credits. Traditionally, tradable permits can either be pur-
chased from the government or allocated for no cost and then traded 
among firms. While either method is efficient, allocating the credits 
at no cost to firms will likely increase support for this proposal from 
the financial sector. 
 This Comment’s main contribution offers a different way to frame 
the systemic risk problem and a novel way to resolve the issue. De-
termining the efficient level of systemic exposure will be difficult but 
not insurmountable. Certainly, a regulator can create exemptions for 
startup firms, firms with balance sheets below a certain level, or not-
for-profit companies. By encouraging firms to internalize the system-
ic consequences of their actions, the level of systemic risk can be re-
duced ex ante, improving the stability of the financial system. 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Ad-
dress at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge 
Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20060516a.htm (stating that the cost of eliminating systemic risk would 
stifle productivity); see also Schwarz, supra note 2, at 23-24 (“Because regulation can be 
costly, efficiency also demands that the costs of regulation do not exceed its benefits.”). 
 166. See Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Raman Uppal, Systemic Risk and International Portfolio 
Choice, 59 J. FIN. 2809, 2817-31 (2004) (attempting to model systemic risk and determine 
optimal portfolio choice); Craig H. Furfine, Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of 
Contagion, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 111, 120-25 (2003) (quantifying risk of conta-
gious bank failures using interbank loan data). See generally Richard A. Posner, Efficient 
Reponses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511 (2006) (discussing pricing of  
catastrophe events). 
 167. See generally HENRY H. WILLIS ET AL., RAND CORP., ESTIMATING TERRORISM RISK 
(2005), available at http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG388.pdf. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 As shown by this Comment, the subprime mortgage crisis is the 
result of an unprecedented regime shift in subprime performance 
combined with inefficient incentives in the financial system. While 
increased defaults are troubling, they are not the result of any real 
market failure. The market appears to have corrected its pricing er-
rors, and there is no reason to believe that market discipline  
is insufficient. 
 Systemic risk, however, must be addressed by regulators. As the 
subprime crisis has illustrated, systemic failures are more than an 
academic concern. Traditional approaches to financial regulation ap-
pear inadequate; the problem is not that particular financial instru-
ments or debt levels are inherently too risky, but that competitive in-
centives in the market lead to inefficient outcomes. Innovation is ne-
cessary and should be encouraged, but regulators must align the 
firms’ private maximizing incentives with efficient social outcomes. 
Otherwise, regulators risk proscribing beneficial financial innova-
tions or falling a step behind the next systemic threat. 
 This Comment has proposed a new framework with which to ana-
lyze the problem that may prove helpful in stabilizing the financial 
system. While further research is necessary, a tradable permit sys-
tem appears to realign incentives for firm managers. A robust mar-
ket in tradable-risk credits could create a system where firms’ max-
imizing incentives are efficient, instead of producing a tragedy of the 
commons that overexploits limited financial resources. 
